Human Capital and Urbanization of the People\u27s Republic of China by Xing, Chunbing
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
International Publications Key Workplace Documents 
10-2016 
Human Capital and Urbanization of the People's Republic of China 
Chunbing Xing 
Beijing Normal University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in International Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Human Capital and Urbanization of the People's Republic of China 
Abstract 
The relationship between human capital development and urbanization in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is explored, highlighting the institutional factors of the hukou system and decentralized fiscal 
system. Educated workers disproportionately reside in urban areas and in large cities, and the returns to 
education are significantly higher in urban areas relative to those in rural areas, and in large, educated 
cities relative to small, less-educated cities. In addition, the external returns to education in urban areas 
are at least comparable to the magnitude of private returns. Rural areas are the major reservoir for urban 
population growth, and the more educated have a higher chance of moving to cities and obtaining urban 
hukou. 
Relaxing the hukou restriction, increasing education levels of rural residents, providing training for 
rural–urban migrants, and guaranteeing equal opportunity for all residents are necessary for a 
sustainable urbanization process in the PRC. In terms of health, rural–urban migration is selective in that 
healthy rural residents choose to migrate. Occupational choices and living onditions are detrimental to 
migrants’ health, however. While sitive effect on migrant children, its effect on “left-behind” children is 
unclear. 
Keywords 
China, human capital development, urbanization, hukou, rural-urban migrants 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Xing, C. (2016). Human capital and urbanization of the People's Republic of China (ADBI Working Paper 
No. 603). Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. 
Required Publisher's Statement 
© Asian Development Back. Available at ADB’s Open Access Repository under a Creative Commons 
Attribution license (CC BY 3.0 IGO). 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/531 
 
 
 
ADBI Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND 
URBANIZATION IN THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Chunbing Xing 
No. 603 
October 2016 
Asian Development Bank Institute 
 
 
 
  
 
The Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the 
numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI’s working papers 
reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. ADBI encourages readers to 
post their comments on the main page for each working paper (given in the citation below). 
Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication. 
 
Suggested citation: 
Xing, C. 2016. Human Capital and Urbanization in the People’s Republic of China. ADBI 
Working Paper 603. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available: 
https://www.adb.org/publications/human-capital-and-urbanization-prc/ 
 
Please contact the author for information about this paper. 
Email: xingchb@bnu.edu.cn 
 
ADB recognizes “China” as the People’s Republic of China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chunbing Xing is a professor at Beijing Normal University, with concentrations in labor 
economics, income distribution, development economics, and education. 
The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments 
they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper 
and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may 
not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms. 
Working papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized 
and considered published. 
Asian Development Bank Institute 
Kasumigaseki Building 8F 
3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku  
Tokyo 100-6008, Japan 
 
Tel:  +81-3-3593-5500 
Fax:  +81-3-3593-5571 
URL:  www.adbi.org 
E-mail:  info@adbi.org 
 
© 2016 Asian Development Bank Institute 
 
ADBI Working Paper 603 C. Xing 
 
Abstract 
 
The relationship between human capital development and urbanization in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) is explored, highlighting the institutional factors of the hukou system and 
decentralized fiscal system. Educated workers disproportionately reside in urban areas and in 
large cities, and the returns to education are significantly higher in urban areas relative to those 
in rural areas, and in large, educated cities relative to small, less-educated cities. In addition, the 
external returns to education in urban areas are at least comparable to the magnitude of private 
returns. Rural areas are the major reservoir for urban population growth, and the more educated 
have a higher chance of moving to cities and obtaining urban hukou.  
 
Relaxing the hukou restriction, increasing education levels of rural residents, providing training 
for rural–urban migrants, and guaranteeing equal opportunity for all residents are necessary for 
a sustainable urbanization process in the PRC. In terms of health, rural–urban migration is 
selective in that healthy rural residents choose to migrate. Occupational choices and living 
conditions are detrimental to migrants’ health, however. While migration has a positive effect on 
migrant children, its effect on “left-behind” children is unclear.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Human capital, which plays an essential role in economic development and the 
urbanization process, refers to the knowledge, skills, and strength accumulated by an 
individual to enhance his or her productivity. Indeed, today’s economic sector has a 
greater demand for labor with more human capital, and urban areas—with large 
populations and high population densities—are ideal places for people to accumulate 
human capital. Cities provide places for knowledge, skills, and ideas to influence 
individuals informally, creating large spillover (i.e., external) effects.  
In developing countries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), human capital also 
facilitates the process of population shifts from rural to urban areas, and the interaction 
between human capital development and urbanization is influenced by institutional 
arrangements and government policies. In the PRC, the decentralized fiscal system 
and hukou (i.e., household registration system) system have major impacts on  
this relationship.  
This study examines how attainment of education performs in the urbanization process 
in the PRC, by noting changes in education levels for rural and urban areas and for 
different provinces and/or cities. Second, how returns to education vary between rural 
and urban areas, and across different provinces and/or cities, is assessed. This study 
then examines if the labor force with different education levels moves freely to meet the 
demand of cities of different sizes, particularly the responsiveness of the labor force 
with different education levels to regional labor demand shocks. The distribution of 
human capital and human capital returns in rural and urban PRC and across cities 
provides hints for evaluating and reforming policies affecting labor mobility. 
As most of the population growth in urban PRC comes from rural–urban migration, the 
characteristics of rural–urban migrants in comparison to rural and urban residents are 
also analyzed to find if selection effects, in terms of education levels, exist in the 
urbanization process. Finally, migrant households’ problems regarding education and 
health are noted, as well how to improve efficiency and equality in these areas. The 
institutional background of the relationship between human capital and institutions is 
analyzed, such as the role played by governments at various levels in allocating 
educational resources as well as that of the hukou system in determining migrants’ 
access to education and health care. Then, educational attainment is discussed in the 
context of rapid urbanization, especially regarding developments in rural and urban 
PRC and across different regions.  
Health issues and their relationship with urbanization, which certainly impact human 
capital development, are also analyzed, while policy implications are discussed in the 
last section. 
Overall, this study finds that cities provide higher returns to education and attract more 
educated workers, but the hukou system still impedes sufficient labor mobility, which is 
especially true for educated workers, implying that the returns to education in cities are 
not fully realized. In addition, significant external returns to education exist in urban 
areas, and rural–urban migration is positively selected in terms of human capital levels.  
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2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
In the PRC, labor mobility is controlled by the hukou system, which has greatly 
influenced the pace and pattern of urbanization (Au and Henderson 2006). 
Traditionally, a person’s hukou status is categorized by both socioeconomic eligibility 
(i.e., agricultural and nonagricultural) and registered residential location (i.e., local and 
nonlocal) (Chan and Buckingham 2008).1 Hukou status is primarily determined by birth 
and is passed from one generation to the next (Wu and Treiman 2004). Thus, by 
controlling migration, the hukou system has been an essential factor in the rural–urban 
divide (Knight and Song 1999, Zhao 2000; Lu 2003).  
Today, urban hukou is associated with better-paid, more secure jobs; access to better 
public services; and more subsidies. Only a small number of rural residents with special 
achievements can obtain urban hukou; as such, going to university or a professional 
school has been a major channel of hukou conversion (i.e., rural to urban). Other 
channels that increase the probability of hukou conversion include joining the military, 
being promoted as a cadre (Wu and Treiman 2004, Fan 2008), purchasing urban 
housing (Deng and Gustafsson 2006), and converting land as a result of city expansion 
(Wong and Huen 1998). 
The hukou system has been undergoing reform since the 1980s, and one major 
change has been the localization of hukou management, with many local governments 
receiving full power to determine their own criteria and number of new local permanent 
hukou registrations that they grant. It has also become easier for workers and 
households to transfer their hukou registrations to other locations—in particular, to 
small- to medium-sized cities—and temporary residence permits are being granted 
more often. Moreover, it has become possible for some with rural hukou to migrate to 
urban areas and be hired without valid permits. 
However, many migrants without urban hukou are still excluded from formal urban 
sectors and earn significantly less than native urban hukou workers (Meng and Zhang 
2001; Meng 2001; Maurer-Fazio and Dinh 2004; Gagnon, Xenogiani, Xing 2014; 
Démurger et al. 2009). If they do migrate to urban areas, these workers are not 
covered by urban social security systems and are thus not entitled to local welfare 
programs, subsidies, and public services, including education (Gagnon, Xenogiani, 
Xing 2014).  
In the PRC, primary school education (i.e., ages 6–11 years) and lower middle school 
(ages 12–14 years) have been compulsory since the late 1980s. As a public service, 
local governments have mostly financed the operation of these schools. Before 2000, 
local governments in rural areas could collect agricultural taxes or fees for education 
expenditures, but these taxes and fees were cancelled in later years, putting financial 
stress on many local governments to adequately finance education. In urban areas, the 
schools are usually not funded to take migrant children. This decentralized feature, 
combined with the hukou system, has caused several problems regarding the 
allocation of educational resources. First, a large gap in educational resources has 
emerged not only between rural and urban areas but also across different regions, and 
even across different districts within a city. Second, with a large amount of migrant 
workers, many children were left behind in their parents’ home province to attend 
school, but today, more children are migrating with their parents, attending schools at 
1  The first classification determines entitlement to state-subsidized food grain and other prerogatives. The 
second classification defines one's rights for many activities in a specific locality 
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their destination location. However, they are still required to take the university 
entrance examinations at their registered hukou province. 
Universities are mainly located in cities, especially in municipalities and provincial 
capitals. Under the earlier central planning regime, higher education was heavily 
subsidized. With economic reforms and the enlargement of the scale of higher 
education, the government has gradually lowered subsidies for higher education. In 
fact, in 1993 guidelines on education reform and development, the central government 
emphasized that higher education is noncompulsory, and that students should pay 
tuition (Government of the PRC, State Council 1993). Thus, from 1995 to 2004, tuition 
fees increased from CNY800 per person per year to CNY5,000 per person per year on 
average (Yang 2006). Expenditures on education ranked first in total household 
expenditure in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, 2001–2005 (CYCRC 2007). 
Another major reform of higher education in the 1990s was to cancel the planning 
system for allocating university graduates throughout the country. The new system is 
effectively a two-sided market. Graduates find jobs based on mutual agreement with 
employers, with much less intervention from the government. University graduates now 
face more competition, putting pressure on the labor market, especially in urban areas. 
Universities are administered by different levels of government. Elite universities are 
generally funded by both the central government (through the Ministry of Education) 
and provincial governments, while many other local universities are mainly funded by 
provincial governments. There are very few privately run universities in the PRC. 
Universities admit students from all over the country, but usually the admission quota is 
higher for the province of location than for other provinces, which is true even for  
elite universities.  
In the last 2 decades, the central government has initiated two major projects (i.e., the 
211 Project and 985 Project), aiming to improve the quality of universities. Their 
objective is to promote the quality of teaching and research by building first-class 
universities. These projects have mainly focused on the elite universities.  
Higher education is closely related to the urbanization process because it not only 
produces graduates with higher human capital levels but also has been a major 
channel through which rural individuals can obtain urban local hukou. 
3. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
IN THE URBANIZATION PROCESS 
3.1 Human Capital Development  
3.1.1 Education Expansion  
The PRC has experienced tremendous education expansion in recent decades. From 
1990 to 2012, the PRC’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual rate of 10%, 
and the amount of fiscal expenditure on education also grew rapidly. In the mid-1990s, 
the share of fiscal expenditure on education in GDP was below 2.5%, and by 2011, it 
reached 4.0% (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Share of Fiscal Expenditure on Education in Gross Domestic Product 
(%) 
 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: Author. 
Figure 2 shows that local governments are responsible for around 90% of the fiscal 
expenditure on education. 
Figure 2: Share of Fiscal Expenditure on Education by Central  
and Local Governments 
(%) 
 
Source: Author. 
Figure 3 shows the share of fiscal expenditure on different education levels in total 
education expenditure. The share of primary education has declined continuously from 
around 35% to 30%, while that of tertiary education has increased significantly in 
recent years. 
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Figure 3: Share of Fiscal Expenditure in Different Levels of Education 
(%) 
 
Source: Author. 
Figure 4 shows that the share of primary school graduates admitted to middle school 
increased from 80% in the early 1990s to around 98% in the early 2010s due to the 
enforcement of the Law of Compulsory Education and increased subsidies, especially 
in poor regions.  
Figure 4: Admission Rates at Various Education Levels 
 
Source: NBS (2015). 
The change in higher education was more dramatic. In 1998, fewer than 50% of high 
school graduates were admitted to university. The percentage increased to 65% in 
1999, and it kept rising in subsequent years. The share of middle school graduates 
admitted to high school also increased continuously from around 50% in the late 1990s 
to nearly 90% in the early 2010s. However, as the returns to high school are low and 
the main function of high schools is preparation for university examinations, the 
expansion in high school can be largely regarded as a response to the expansion in 
tertiary education. Between 2003 and 2007, the increase in the number of high school 
graduates (and the middle school to high school admission rate) was so dramatic that 
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the share of high school graduates admitted to university decreased. Yet the number  
of students admitted to universities kept increasing. Starting from around 2008, the 
number of high school graduates stopped rising, and the admission rate into 
universities increased again. 
As a result of education expansion, the number of university graduates increased 
dramatically starting from early 2000. For example, the number of university graduates 
in 2000 was 1.03 million. By 2012, the number reached 6.25 million (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Number of Graduates at Various Levels of Education  
(million) 
 
Source: NBS (2013). 
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3.1.2 Human Capital in Rural and Urban Areas 
In this section, two nationally representative datasets are used to show that human 
capital development is unbalanced between rural and urban areas. The first dataset is 
from three waves of the PRC Household Income Project (CHIP) in 1995, 2002, and 
2007 (Table 1).  
Table 1: Distribution of Education Levels, 1995–2007  
(%) 
 1995 2002 2007 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Primary and below 6.6 47.9 4.4 36.6 2.3 25.8 
Middle school 32.0 40.7 27.9 47.4 19.9 55.2 
High school 24.1 9.6 28.0 11.8 27.5 12.6 
Technical school 15.3 1.3 11.0 3.0 10.6 3.8 
Professional school 15.0 0.4 19.7 1.0 24.2 1.7 
University and above 7.0 0.2 9.0 0.3 15.5 0.9 
Note: Observations are restricted to those aged 22–54 years, who are able to work and are out of school. 
Sources: Calculated using Risken, Renwei, and Shin (1995); Shi (2002); China Institute for Income Distribution (2007). 
The increase in the level of human capital is dramatic in urban PRC, as the share  
of the sample with university degrees increased from 7% in 1995 to 16% in 2007. If 
education levels above professional school are included, the increase is even more 
dramatic, with the share increasing from 22% to 40% between 1995 and 2007. In 
contrast, the share of the sample with tertiary education in rural areas increased only 
slightly, from 0.6% in 1995 to 2.6% in 2007. 
Table 2: Distribution of Education Levels, 2000 and 2005  
(%) 
 
2000 2005 
 
By Hukou Type By Hukou Type By Type of Residence 
 
Non-
agricultural Agricultural 
Non-
agricultural Agricultural 
Urban 
(city) 
Suburban 
(town) 
Countryside 
(village) 
 Share of various education levels within agricultural/non-agricultural Hukou or rural–urban areas  (%, column total = 100) 
Below primary 1.3 8.0 1.3 8.6 2.1 4.5 10.1 
Primary 9.2 39.0 7.9 34.3 13.2 21.7 37.1 
Middle school 36.5 46.4 34.3 49.0 42.0 47.5 45.6 
High school 22.5 5.8 32.4 7.5 26.1 17.4 6.3 
Technical school 13.2 0.7      
Professional 12.3 0.2 15.8 0.5 10.3 6.8 0.8 
University and above 5.1 0.0 8.5 0.1 6.4 2.1 0.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Agricultural–non-agricultural Hukou or rural–urban distribution for different education levels (%, row total = 100) 
Below primary 5.5 94.5 5.8 94.3 10.8 12.0 77.2 
Primary 7.7 92.3 8.7 91.4 16.3 14.0 69.7 
Middle school 21.7 78.4 22.4 77.7 31.0 18.2 50.9 
High school 57.8 42.2 64.1 35.9 58.4 20.2 21.4 
Technical school 86.2 13.8      
Professional 95.9 4.1 92.8 7.2 68.2 23.6 8.3 
University and above 99.2 0.9 98.0 2.0 83.7 14.0 2.3 
Total 26.0 74.0 29.2 70.8 33.0 17.1 49.9 
Note: Observations are restricted to those aged 22–54 years, who are able to work and are out of school. 
Sources: Calculated using random samples of NBS (2000) and NBS (2005).  
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This pattern is also observed in the second dataset, the 2000 census data and the 1% 
population survey for 2005 (Table 2).  
Between 2000 and 2005, the share of population aged 22–54 years with professional 
school degrees and above increased from 18% to 26% in urban areas. In contrast, the 
share only increased from 0.2% to 0.6% in rural areas. The last four columns in Table 2 
indicate that a majority of the less-educated population (i.e., middle school graduates 
and below) was concentrated in rural areas, while highly educated workers mostly 
resided in urban areas. 
This pattern remains true when observing the population aged above 6 years, rather 
than the restricted sample of the working-age population (Table 3). Even in the most 
recent data from the 2010 census, a huge gap exists in education, especially in  
tertiary education. 
Table 3: Education Levels for Population Aged above 6 Years, 2000 and 2010 
 2000 2010 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
 (10,000) (%) (10,000) (%) 
Illiterate 1,165 6,930 4.2 9.8 803 4,417 2.1 7.2 
Primary school 6,132 33,359 22.4 47.1 6,128 23,207 16.0 38.1 
Middle school 10,145 26,025 37.0 36.7 13,859 27,381 36.1 44.9 
High school 4,569 3,307 16.7 4.7 9,363 4,710 24.4 7.7 
Technical (zhongzhuan) 2,176 849 7.9 1.2     
Professional 1,956 325 7.1 0.5 4,375 942 11.4 1.5 
University 1,208 52 4.4 0.1 3,509 302 9.1 0.5 
Graduate 84 2 0.3 0.0 378 12 1.0 0.0 
Total 27,435 70,849 100 100 38,415 60,971 100 100 
Sources: Calculated from NBS (2000) and NBS (2010).  
3.1.3 Human Capital across Provinces and Cities 
Using random samples from 2000 census data and 2005 1% population survey, the 
size of the working age population (defined as those aged 23–55 years and not in 
school) was calculated, as was the share of workers with university degrees or above 
for each prefecture-level city.2 Figure 6 shows the relationship between this share and 
the population for 2000 (left panel) and 2005 (right panel).  
The figure suggests that individuals of different education levels were not randomly 
located in different cities; there is a positive correlation between the share of university 
graduates and population size, and the correlation seems to be stronger for 2005 than 
for 2000. 
Figure 7 further shows changes in the share of university graduates in each prefecture-
level city against the city’s initial share of university graduates in 2000. There is a 
significantly positive relationship between the share of university graduates in 2000 and 
subsequent change in the share of skilled workers. 
  
2  As the sample is random, the number of observations are counted in each city and used as the  
city's population. 
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Figure 6: Share of Skilled Workers and Population, 2000 and 2005 
 
Notes:  
1. Population refers to the number of observations in each city in the dataset.  
2. Skilled share refers to the share of observations with university or above degrees.  
Sources: Calculated from NBS (2000) and NBS (2005).  
Figure 7: Changes in the Share of University Graduates and Education  
Levels, 2000 
 
Sources: Calculated from NBS (2000) and NBS (2005). 
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Figure 8 shows that there is also a positive correlation between the change in the share 
of university graduates and share of university graduates in 2000.  
Figure 8: Changes in the Share of University Graduates and Population, 2000 
 
Sources: Calculated from NBS (2000) and NBS (2005). 
In summary, the evidence suggests that large cities have attracted more educated 
workers. Moreover, between 2000 and 2005, large and educated cities became more 
educated. 
3.2 Returns to Education 
Since education is a major form of human capital, educated workers, on average, earn 
more than less-educated workers. Returns to education (i.e., the wage increase 
associated with a certain number of years of schooling like 4 years of university 
education) depend on various circumstances such as infrastructure, economic 
structure, and population. In the following section, returns to education are shown to be 
significantly higher in urban than in rural areas in the PRC, and within urban areas, it is 
significantly higher in larger and more educated cities. 
3.2.1 Returns to Education in Rural and Urban Areas 
To estimate the returns to education for rural and urban PRC separately, rural and 
urban surveys of the CHIP data for 1995, 2002, and 2007 were used. Also, 2005 1% 
population survey data were used, which covered both rural and urban PRC. The 
returns to education were estimated by running ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of the wages in log form on years of schooling and other standard controls 
including gender, experience, experience squared, and region dummies.  
The study notes that returns to education were significantly higher in urban than in rural 
areas, and the gap seems to increase from the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, for example, 
the returns to education were around 5.0% in urban PRC, while that for rural areas 
were 2.0%. By 2007, the returns to education increased to 11.0% in urban areas, while 
remaining low at 2.7% in rural areas. The gap is also large in 2005, for which year the 
data from the 1% population survey were used (13.0% versus 4.0%) (Table 4).3 
3  The Heckit model was also used to correct for selection bias and to obtain similar results. The results 
from another dataset (China Health and Nutrition Survey) showed similar patterns of rural and urban 
returns to education. 
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Table 4: Returns to Education in Rural and Urban People’s Republic of China  
(coefficients on years of schooling in wage equations) 
 1995 2002 2005 2007 
 (1) (2) (4) (3) 
Urban 0.049*** 0.094*** 0.125*** 0.111*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) 
Rural 0.020* 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.027*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Notes:  
1.  Experience, experience squared, gender, and provincial dummies in the ordinary least squares regressions are 
controlled for. 
2.  The sample is restricted to those aged 22–54 years, who are able to work and are not in school.  
3.  *, **, and *** are significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
4.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Sources: Risken, Renwei, and Shin (1995); Shi (2002); China Institute for Income Distribution (2007).were used for the 
1995, 2002, and 2007 results, respectively, and NBS (2005) was used for the 2005 data. The dependent variable is log 
of hourly wage, except for 2007, for which annual wage was used.  
There are two important, related aspects that need to be emphasized. First, the returns 
to education in rural areas do not take into consideration the role of education in 
increasing the probability of rural people migrating to urban areas. Chen and Xing 
(2006) showed that the probability of having a nonfarm job increases significantly with 
education level. More importantly, as mentioned earlier, going to university has been a 
major channel of converting one’s hukou status from rural to urban.  
3.2.2 University Premiums 
Within urban areas, education expansion was accompanied by a continuous increase 
in the returns to higher education. Figure 9 summarizes several studies and shows that 
the university premium increased dramatically in the 1990s.  
Figure 9: Returns to University, 1988 to 2008  
(%) 
 
Note: The reference group is high school graduates. 
Sources: Zhang et al. (2005); Meng, Shen, Xie (2010); Li and Ding (2003). 
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As indicated in Figure 9, by the end of the 1990s, the returns to university education 
reached 30%–50%. Possibly due to the expansion policy, the increasing trend stopped 
after 2003, but university premiums were still approaching 40% (Meng, Shen,  
Xie 2010).4  
Recent research has also shown that the unemployment rate increased for young 
university graduates. Even with an unemployment rate of 20%, the expected returns 
from a university education could still be as high as 30%. Moreover, the unemployment 
rate for university graduates of older ages was much lower than for those of other 
education levels.  
3.2.3 Returns to Education across Regions and Cities 
Given the considerable effort devoted to estimating the returns to education, the 
extension to include a regional dimension is a natural next step. As a large developing 
country in economic transition, the PRC’s various regions have different levels of 
economic development. Possible reasons for regional dispersion in returns to 
education include institutional factors such as different shares of the private sector 
across regions, different degrees of openness (in terms of trade activity and foreign 
direct investment), and sets of “place-based” policies.5  
Evidence from CHIP Data, 1995, 2002, and 2007. The returns to years of schooling 
and to various levels of education were estimated for a number of provinces using two 
different models: 
 (1) 
 (2) 
In model 1, SCHOOLING is years of formal schooling, and in model 2, EDUi are 
dummies for various education levels. X controls for the same factors as in model 1. 
Results for these models are reported in columns 4–9 of Table 5.  
For the earlier period (1995–2002, columns 4–5), the returns to years of schooling 
increased sharply across all regions. There was also large variation across regions in 
the returns to education. In 1995, the returns to years of schooling varied by around 
3%–4%. In 2002, Guangdong had the highest returns to schooling (8.4%), while Hubei 
and Yunnan had the lowest returns (4.6%–4.7%).  
Between 2002 and 2007 (columns 5–6), returns to education stopped rising or even 
declined in the central and western provinces. For coastal regions, the returns to 
education kept rising, however; in some cases, the increase was dramatic (e.g., 6% to 
11% in Beijing). The regional dispersion in the returns to education became larger. The 
university premium shows similar patterns, but its dispersion increased only slightly 
(columns 7–9).  
Due to the limitation of space, the returns to other education levels are not reported, 
although some features of these returns are worth noting. First, most of the increases 
in the returns to education were concentrated in higher levels of education, especially 
university education. Second, coastal regions witnessed rising returns for almost every 
4 These results were obtained using employed observations. 
5 For a more detailed discussion, see Whalley and Xing (2014). 
( ) 0 1ln * γXWAGE SCHOOLINGβ β ε= + + +
( ) 0ln * γXi i
i
WAGE EDUβ γ ε= + + +∑
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tertiary education level. Finally, the returns to high school decreased between 1995 
and 2007. 
Table 5: Returns to Education and University Premium in Urban People’s 
Republic of China, by Province, 1995–2007  
Province 
Skilled Workers’ 
Share 
Returns to Years of 
Schooling 
College Premium 
(college vs. high school) 
1995 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Beijing* 51.6 47.7 61.2 0.026 0.059 0.114 0.207 0.414 0.618 
Shanxi 43.4 44.0 49.9 0.037 0.059 0.066 0.193 0.315 0.470 
Liaoning* 39.2 41.0 48.6 0.048 0.075 0.078 0.333 0.602 0.510 
Shanghai*   46.8   0.135   0.895 
Jiangsu* 32.9 36.4 45.4 0.034 0.058 0.117 0.057 0.537 0.657 
Zhejiang*   43.7   0.114   0.574 
Anhui 34.0 41.8 47.0 0.031 0.072 0.053 0.248 0.401 0.345 
Fujian*   51.9   0.091   0.442 
Henan 38.8 42.2 62.6 0.039 0.056 0.066 0.325 0.445 0.504 
Hubei 41.3 51.3 55.3 0.027 0.046 0.080 0.334 0.365 0.499 
Hunan   53.0   0.077   0.513 
Guangdong* 36.3 41.2 52.7 0.037 0.084 0.117 0.433 0.684 0.700 
Chongqing 42.8 40.3 48.4 0.039 0.056 0.066 0.164 0.559 0.587 
Sichuan 41.6 36.9 51.4 0.028 0.058 0.089 0.199 0.495 0.640 
Yunnan 45.6 51.7 52.3 0.027 0.047 0.090 0.219 0.332 0.566 
Gansu 37.4 43.1 48.7 0.039 0.074 0.072 0.367 0.504 0.457 
Standard 
Dev. 
40.2 43.4 51.6 
(52.4) 
0.007 0.012 0.024 
(0.022) 
0.104 0.113 0.127 
(0.101) 
Notes:  
1.  For each province, an ordinary least squares regression of wage equations was run to obtain returns to education.  
2.  Experience, experience squared, gender, industry, and ownership dummies were controlled for.  
3.  In the first three columns, skilled labor includes those with university degrees (3 or 4 years) or above and technical 
school graduates. Those with high school degrees or below are classified as unskilled workers.  
4.  Numbers in parentheses are calculated by excluding the newly added provinces in 2007.  
5.  Coastal provinces are marked with “*”. 
Source: Author. 
The estimate wage equations were also estimated for 62, 61, and 91 cities for 1995, 
2002, and 2007, respectively, using the same specification as in model 1. After 
calculating the returns to education, their yearly kernel densities were estimated 
nonparametrically, each city being treated as an observation without using city 
population or employment as weight. The Epanechnikov kernel function was used, and 
the bandwidth was set at 0.02. The distributions are reported in Figure 10.6  
  
6  Kernel densities of the returns to education were also estimated across cities using cities that were 
covered in all three surveys. While only 33 cities remained, and the estimates became less accurate, 
the regional distribution evolved in a similar pattern. It is not reported here due to space constraints. 
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Figure 10: Distribution of Return to Years of Schooling at the City Level 
 
Source: Author. 
Apparently, they are nondegenerate in all 3 years. The distribution moves to the  
right and becomes more dispersed between 1995 and 2002. In the second period 
(2002–2007), it moves slightly to the right. A fatter right tail is observed in the  
2007 distribution, which is likely due to the fairly high returns to education of some 
coastal cities. 
Evidence from the 1% population survey in 2005. Using the 1% population survey of 
2005, the returns to education for all prefecture-level cities were estimated. Using the 
sample for each city (i.e., individuals aged 22–55 years and out of school), regressions 
of the individual income in log terms on years of schooling, age, age squared, and 
gender were run.  
The estimated returns (i.e., the coefficients on years of schooling) show a large 
regional variation, with the returns for most cities ranging from 5% to 15%. The 
correlation between the returns to education and city size and the education level of the 
city population are particularly interesting. Figure 11 shows that the returns to years of 
schooling are positively correlated with city population; larger cities had higher returns. 
Of course, there is large heterogeneity in cities of similar size.  
Figure 11: Returns to Education and Population, 2005 
 
Source: Author. 
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Figure 12 also shows a positive correlation between the returns to years of schooling 
and the share of university graduates in a city. 
Figure 12: Returns to Education and Share of University Graduates, 2005 
 
Source: Author. 
The fact that the returns to education have not been equalized across provinces  
and cities indicates that across-region mobility of skilled labor is insufficient to  
meet the regional demand shocks. Figure 13 provides further evidence supporting  
this conclusion.  
The left panel of Figure 13 shows that around one-third of skilled workers were 
migrants in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong, and over 10% of skilled workers in 
23 provinces were migrants; these shares are much lower than those for unskilled 
workers, especially in coastal regions (i.e., right panel of Figure 13). Taking into 
consideration the large difference in the number of skilled and unskilled workers, skilled 
migrants were much lower in number than unskilled migrants.7  
Figure 13 also reports the relationship between these shares and the real wages  
of skilled and unskilled workers. The results suggest that skilled workers were less 
responsive to regional income differentials than unskilled workers. While wage 
differences were much larger for skilled workers, their migrant share differences were 
lower than the share for unskilled workers.8  
These results point to how university graduates should be allocated, favoring coastal 
regions over noncoastal regions. As it still poses high costs for a large proportion of 
skilled workers, relaxing the hukou system could also help facilitate the migration of 
skilled workers. Indeed, skilled workers seem to have a greater potential to move than 
unskilled workers. By 2007, they had larger regional wage differentials than unskilled 
workers. The expanded wage differentials mainly reflect local wage increases among 
7  According to the calculation based on the 2005 1% population survey, the ratio of unskilled to skilled 
migrants is 5.8 to 1.0 in the urban labor market. 
8  Regressing provincial incomes of skilled workers on migrant shares of skilled urban workers, a 
coefficient of 0.00017(0.000015) was obtained, which is much smaller than the results for unskilled 
workers, 0.00068(0.00008). Dropping Yunnan Province produced the results 0.00017(0.000014) and 
0.00072(0.000080), respectively.  
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skilled workers in coastal regions, suggesting a lower geographic mobility among 
skilled workers.9 
Figure 13: Relationship between Real Wages and Migrant Share of Skilled  
and Unskilled Workers 
 
Notes:  
1. Wages are deflated using provincial-level urban consumer price indexes.  
2. The price levels for all provinces are normalized to one in 1995.  
3. Skilled workers are those having degrees higher than high school and with positive wage income.  
4. Migrants are those who have left their hukou registration location and have been working in another city for more than 
half of a year.  
Sources: NBS (2005); China Statistical Yearbook (1997–2006). 
Further, the results in Table 6 indicate that skilled migrant households had a stronger 
preference for permanent housing, social security, and public services that are closely 
related to hukou status.10 Panel A in Table 6 shows that skilled migrant households 
were more likely to purchase permanent housing rather than rent an apartment or  
live in construction site dormitories. Around 54% of the skilled migrant households 
purchased permanent housing, while only 24% of unskilled migrant households had. In 
9  This is consistent with Topel (1986), which showed that the largest local wage adjustments occur 
among workers who exhibit the least geographic mobility. 
10  Panel A uses the 2005 1% population survey; panels B and C use the floating population monitoring 
data for 2012 compiled by the National Health and Family Planning Commission. 
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large cities, the percentages for both skilled and unskilled migrant households were 
significantly lower than in small- and medium-sized cities, perhaps due to high housing 
prices and discrimination against migrant households.  
Table 6: Migrants’ Propensity to Purchase Housing and Willingness  
to Settle Down and Change Hukou  
(%) 
 Top 10 Largest 11th–50th Remaining Total 
 A: share of migrant household purchasing permanent housing (2005 1% population survey) 
Unskilled 17.54 24.05 30.80 23.92 
Skilled 48.96 57.75 58.14 53.63 
Total 24.53 30.07 35.27 29.61 
 B: share of migrant household willing to stay for 5+ years (2012 migrant survey data) 
Unskilled 64.49 57.28 57.23 59.34 
Skilled 72.35 60.57 56.99 64.48 
Total 66.11 57.74 57.20 60.13 
 C: share of migrant household willing to change hukou (2012 migrant survey data) 
Unskilled 60.37 45.64 41.55 48.48 
Skilled 72.66 51.36 43.50 58.07 
Total 62.90 46.44 41.78 49.95 
Note: The skilled are households whose household heads have professional degrees or above. 
Source: Author. 
Panel B shows that 64% of the skilled migrant households were willing to stay in cities 
for over 5 years, while 59% of unskilled migrant households were willing to do so. 
Skilled migrant households had an even stronger willingness to stay in the top 10 
largest cities relative to unskilled migrant households (72% versus 64%). For small 
cities, the percentages were roughly the same for both household types.  
Panel C shows that skilled migrant households were more willing to change hukou 
registration than the unskilled. In the top 10 largest cities, 73% of skilled households 
wanted to change their hukou registration, and the percentage for the unskilled was 
60%. The percentages were much lower in small- and medium-sized cities for both 
skilled and unskilled migrant households, and the difference between skilled and 
unskilled households became smaller as the city size decreases. 
The difference in the willingness to settle down or convert hukou status may be due to 
the fact that migrants with higher education levels are better treated in destination 
cities. In some big cities, for example, migrants with university degrees are more likely 
to get an urban local hukou, perhaps providing an explanation for their greater 
willingness to settle down near their workplaces. If this is true, educated workers 
without local urban hukou would be willing to accept a job with lower wages in 
exchange for chances of converting their hukou in the future.  
However, the results in Gagnon, Xenogiani, and Xing (2014) indicated that urban 
migrants (i.e., migrants with urban hukou) earn significantly more than urban native 
workers. One explanation is that urban residents who usually have higher education 
levels often need to sacrifice hukou-related benefits in their origin hukou registration 
locations to move to other places. They must thus be compensated in monetary terms 
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to make a move. An alternative explanation is that workers must earn significantly more 
than local workers to pay for local hukou-related services, but this latter explanation is 
less likely to hold because a wage premium for rural migrants was not observed. Either 
explanation means that the wage premium for urban migrants actually indicates high 
opportunity costs for educated workers in migration. Finally, the fact that there are 
many skilled migrants without local hukou suggests that the hukou system restricts the 
mobility of skilled migrants. 
These results again suggest that relaxing the hukou system, particularly the hukou 
restriction in large cities, would encourage more skilled rather than unskilled workers to 
move to cities with high skill premium. Such reforms will not only let skilled workers 
respond to regional demand changes but also help reduce inequality in high-premium 
cities. This, of course, does not mean that the mobility of unskilled workers should be 
restricted, nor does it mean that the current restriction on the mobility of unskilled 
workers needs not be reformed. On the contrary, given the complementarity between 
skilled and unskilled workers and the shortage of migrant workers, hukou restrictions 
should also be relaxed for unskilled workers. 
3.3 Externalities of Human Capital  
Although there is more recent literature on estimating external returns to education, 
little is known about this aspect of human capital in the PRC, except through studies 
like Liu (2007) and Glaeser and Lu (2013). Both studies found that external returns to 
education in cities are significantly high. Liu (2007) used CHIP data from 1988 and 
1995 and found that the external returns are at least as high as private returns to 
education. In particular, OLS estimates of the external returns ranged from 4.9% to 
6.7%. He also used the compulsory education law as an instrumental variable. The 
two-stage least square estimates indicated that a 1-year increase in city average 
education could increase individual earnings by between 11% and 13%.  
Glaeser and Lu (2013) utilized more recent data and employed another strategy to 
address the endogeneity issue. Using university relocation in the 1950s as an 
instrumental variable, they found that the external returns to education in urban PRC 
are large—the OLS regressions showed that 1 more year in city-level education leads 
to a 11.9% increase in hourly wage. After using IV, the human capital externality rose 
to 21.9%, almost twice of the OLS estimates. The change in the estimate of human 
capital externality is greater for the most skilled workers. 
Thus, given large external returns to education, governments should subsidize human 
capital investment. Whether local (i.e., provincial) or central governments should fund 
this subsidy depends on the mobility of educated workers. If the educated workers are 
highly mobile (similar to many developed countries like the United States), the central 
government should take more responsibility in subsidizing higher education. If, on the 
other hand, highly educated workers tend to stay where they obtain their education, 
local governments should share more responsibility. 
Disregarding the financing of higher education, local governments should create 
measures to attract educated workers. Such measures include relaxing hukou 
restrictions to reduce the cost of moving, industrial policies that can create jobs for 
educated workers, and also efforts to provide more amenities valued by educated 
workers (e.g., cleaner air, quality education, museums, and libraries). 
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4. HUMAN CAPITAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Selectivity of Rural–Urban Migration  
In the 2002 urban survey of CHIPS, urban residents were asked when they received 
urban hukou. Those who answered with a specific year were, of course, former rural 
residents who had successfully obtained urban hukou, helping identify permanent 
migrants. As shown in Table 7, around 20% of urban residents were not born with 
urban hukou, among whom over one-half obtained urban hukou within the last 
2 decades, a figure consistent with the fact that the hukou system has become  
less restrictive. 
Table 7: Permanent Migrants 
(%) 
Time of 
Obtaining 
Urban Hukou 
 
Ways Former Rural Residents Get Urban Hukou (%) 
 
Education 
Cadre 
Promotion 
Join 
Army 
Lose 
Land 
Buy 
Housing Others Missing Total 
Born urban 16,278 – – – – – – – – 
–1950 133 18.05 8.27 15.79 2.26 9.02 37.59 9.02 100 
1951–60 509 28.29 4.91 13.36 0.59 3.93 40.86 8.06 100 
1961–70 484 18.18 3.93 31.82 1.45 2.27 33.88 8.47 100 
1971–80 839 23.60 4.53 14.18 2.86 1.91 49.70 3.22 100 
1981–90 1,312 33.16 1.45 5.34 8.08 3.96 43.45 4.57 100 
1991– 884 16.52 0.68 2.71 12.44 7.81 53.05 6.79 100 
Missing 193 – – – – – – – – 
Total 20,632         
Source: Author. 
Table 7 also describes channels through which rural residents obtained urban hukou. 
The largest share obtained it through formal education, and the second-largest share 
through joining the military. Other channels take up a relatively small share of the 
permanent migrant population.  
Different channels of hukou conversion play different roles in different time periods.11 
Among those who obtained urban hukou in the 1980s, more than 30% did so through 
education. Even during the 1960s, when joining the military was the major channel, 
more than 18% of permanent migrants still obtained their hukou via education. 
Membership in a cadre and joining the military both played smaller roles. From the 
1970s to the 1990s, the number of rural residents who gained urban hukou after having 
their lands occupied or after purchasing housing in urban areas grew significantly, from 
less than 5% to more than 20%. 
In the next analysis, data were restricted to individuals aged 18–60 years12 who were 
not in school. The share of the rural and urban samples remained almost unchanged. 
To avoid the endogeneity problem of education, permanent migrants who obtained 
urban hukou under the age of 16 years were dropped. Next, the subsamples were 
compared with the first two (i.e., urban natives and permanent migrants) having  
11  Nearly one-half of the permanent migrants did not report how they obtained their urban hukou. Here, 
only those who reported this information were considered. 
12  The results were unaffected by increasing the cut-off age to 22 years. When using per capita income, all 
dependents were included in the calculations.  
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urban hukou and the last two (i.e., rural residents and temporary migrants)13 having 
rural hukou.  
Table 8: Rural and Urban Residents and Migrants Aged 18–60 Years 
 
A: Male B: Female 
 
Urban Residents Rural 
Residents 
w/o 
Migrants 
Migrant 
w/o 
Hukou 
Urban Residents Rural 
Residents 
w/o 
Migrants 
Migrant 
w/o 
Hukou 
 
Natives 
Migrant 
w/ Hukou Natives 
Migrant w/ 
Hukou 
Years of schooling 11.14 11.67 7.67 8.18 10.65 9.9 6.33 7.52 
By education level         
Primary and below 0.03 0.05 0.27 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.50 0.31 
Middle school 0.29 0.20 0.53 0.60 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.55 
High school 0.39 0.31 0.18 0.19 0.42 0.35 0.10 0.13 
College and above 0.29 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.19 0.01 0.01 
Note: High school includes professional schools. 
Source: Author. 
Panel A of Table 8 presents statistics for men. Urban natives and rural residents 
(without migrants) are first compared. The urban natives were better educated than 
rural residents, with the average number of years of schooling for the two groups being 
11.1 and 7.7, respectively. In terms of age, ethnicity, and political status, urban natives 
were older, less likely to be minorities, and more likely to have party memberships. 
Finally, around 81% of urban natives had wage incomes in 2002, while this percentage 
was only 42% for rural residents.  
Migrants without local urban hukou were slightly more educated than rural residents, 
much younger, and less likely to have party memberships. Among permanent migrants, 
more than 40% had an education above a university degree—a figure much higher 
than that for urban natives. Permanent migrants’ share of party memberships was also 
much higher than that of urban natives. The dissimilarities are more significant when 
comparing permanent migrants with rural residents. These characteristics indicate that 
permanent migrants were positively selected, and that the selection effect was larger 
for permanent migrants than for temporary migrants. 
Panel B of Table 8 presents the statistics for women. The contrasts between rural 
women and urban women are similar to those between rural and urban men. Urban 
women had higher levels of education, were less likely to be minorities, and were more 
likely to be party members and wage earners. However, for female urban residents, the 
differential patterns for natives and migrants were dissimilar to those for men. Both the 
migrants’ education level and labor participation rate were slightly lower than those of 
their urban native counterparts, and their likelihood of being party members was almost 
the same as that of the natives.  
Table 9 gives summary statistics for wage earners (workers). Wage earners had 
slightly higher levels of education than the whole sample, especially women. The 
contrasts between urban and rural residents, and between urban natives and 
permanent migrants, are similar to those presented in Table 8. Because the labor 
participation rate was relatively high for urban residents and migrants, statistics for 
wage earners are similar to those in Table 8.  
  
13  The rural resident sample did not include migrants. 
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Table 9: Summary Statistics for Wage Earners Aged 18 to 60 Years 
 
A: Male B: Female 
 
Urban 
Natives 
Migrant 
w/ 
Hukou 
Rural 
Local 
Workers 
Migrant 
w/o 
Hukou 
Urban 
Natives 
Migrant 
w/ Hukou 
Rural 
Local 
Workers 
Migrant 
w/o 
Hukou 
Years of schooling 11.42 12.06 8.00 8.16 11.51 11.12 7.60 7.64 
By education level        
 Primary and below 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.33 0.30 
 Middle school 0.26 0.16 0.54 0.60 0.20 0.25 0.44 0.56 
 High school 0.39 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.47 0.41 0.21 0.13 
 College and above 0.33 0.49 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.30 0.02 0.02 
Note: High school includes professional schools. 
Source: Author. 
The above analysis used CHIPS data for 2002, which were relatively old. However, the 
evidence is consistent with the existence of positive selection in recent years. First, 
categories like buying a house and losing land have become increasingly important. 
Although migrants of these categories were less educated than those who changed 
their hukou status through the educational channel, they remain positively selected 
from the rural population. Second, as shown previously, the rural population had an 
extremely low share of university graduates, and this situation has improved only 
marginally since the early 1990s. 14  Meanwhile, the number of rural high school 
graduates taking university entrance exams has increased dramatically since the late 
1990; thus, there must have been positive selection in recent years. Third, the returns 
to education (both private and external) were significantly lower in rural than in urban 
areas, which provided an incentive for more educated workers to migrate to cities. 
The selectivity in migration has a major impact on the pattern of urbanization. One 
major implication for education policy in urbanization is that education for rural 
residents is important because they constitute a reservoir for urban population growth. 
Improving the quality of rural education should be a policy priority given the large  
rural–urban gap in this aspect. One alternative is to let rural children be educated in 
cities, but the financial and psychological costs are usually high, especially for primary 
and secondary education. 
4.2 Higher Education Expansion Promotes Urbanization 
As mentioned earlier, the PRC’s higher education expansion not only increased the 
education levels of the labor force but also accelerated the urbanization process. It had 
differential impacts not only on the education levels of both rural and urban areas but 
also on the education levels and development across different regions. To see these 
effects more clearly, the facts that higher education plays an important role in helping 
rural residents obtain urban hukou and that higher education expansion is unevenly 
distributed across provinces are taken into consideration. 
Figure 14 shows the number of university students per capita in different provinces 
between 1998 and 2005. The left panel indicates that the number of students in 
universities is strongly correlated between 1998 and 2005, and the education 
expansion since 1999 increased rather than reduced the regional gap in the number of 
students. The right panel shows that the more students that a province had in 1998, the 
larger the increase in that province between 1998 and 2005. This feature is mainly 
14  While the share of university graduates increased from 7% to 18% in urban PRC between 1993 and 
2006, the same for rural PRC only increased from 0.1% to 1.3%. 
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driven by the facts that higher education expanded by increasing the admission quota 
of existing universities (rather than establishing new universities).  
Figure 14: Number of University Students in School and Changes  
between 1998 and 2005, by Province 
 
Source: Author. 
In a recent empirical study, Xing (2013) explored this regional variation in higher 
education expansion and found that this policy significantly increases the probability  
of an urban resident having a university degree. The research suggested that the 
probability of rural residents going to university also increases significantly and those 
who were admitted to universities stay on in urban areas. Without higher education 
expansion, they may not have migrated out of rural areas or may have worked in urban 
areas as “peasant workers” rather than in the formal sector. Therefore, education 
expansion is a major policy instrument that facilitates the PRC’s urbanization process.  
In this sense, education policy should offer equal education opportunities for rural 
residents who are the major source of urban population growth. This policy could 
potentially guarantee qualified skilled workers for urban growth. For youth from rural 
PRC, 3–4 years of university education also means a process of assimilation. Other 
policies that could help university graduates find jobs should also be designed. In 
particular, graduates from rural areas should not be discriminated against in finding 
jobs in urban labor markets. 
5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL ISSUES IN URBANIZATION 
The PRC’s urbanization has created various challenges in human capital development, 
sometimes at the price of sacrificing or threatening the human capital of the next 
generation. Many of these problems are caused by institutional arrangements, in 
particular the hukou system and fiscal arrangement. 
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Due to the restrictions of the hukou system, the majority of rural migrants in cities  
do not have access to pensions, health care, public education, and other social 
benefits at the place that they live. The number of migrant children aged 6–14 years in 
cities is estimated at 20 million. However, funding for elementary education is mainly 
determined by the number of children with local hukou and is not portable across 
administrative units. Therefore, local authorities lack incentives and financial resources 
to accommodate migrant children in public schools. Three options, instead, are 
available for migrant families: (i) they can send their children to local public schools 
(although school-choice fees are sometimes required), (ii) they can send them to 
privately run migrant schools (which are often poorly run), or (iii) they can leave their 
children at home in the custody of relatives. 
Literature has been trying to assess the impact of migration behavior on children’s 
human capital. Chen and Feng (2013) found that migrant students who are unable to 
enroll in public schools perform significantly worse than their counterparts in both 
Chinese and mathematics. An earlier study by Liang and Chen (2007) also showed 
that temporary migrant children are much less likely to be enrolled in schools compared 
with local children. 15  Goodburn (2009) concluded that administrative and financial 
barriers, as well as discrimination, prevent migrant children from entering public 
schools, and temporary migrants with less than 1 year of residence in cities suffer  
the most.  
In recent years, the urban population increased dramatically in many cities, especially 
in the large ones. Due to inelastic housing supply in urban centers, most newly arrived 
migrants live in suburban or newly converted urban areas, where the public schools or 
newly established migrant schools are of low quality. On the contrary, quality education 
resources tend to be distributed in urban centers. As a consequence, spatial sorting  
in terms of both residence and education emerges. Breaking this spatial sorting and 
promoting equal distribution of education resources are major policy challenges 
necessary for many large cities. 
6. HEALTH AND URBANIZATION 
Urbanization and health also influence each other significantly. Economists have 
realized that better health can improve productivity and income levels (Strauss and 
Thomas 1998). Economic development, urbanization in particular, can impact health, 
either positively or negatively, through several channels: (i) higher income with 
urbanization enables individuals and households to invest more in nutrition and health; 
(ii) better health facilities help urban residents improve health; (iii) living conditions  
for migrants are generally disadvantaged; (iv) migrant workers tend to work in 
economic sectors that are bad for their health or have higher risks (e.g., construction); 
(v) newly arrived migrants bear psychological scars because of new environments and 
possible discrimination against them; and (vi) urban areas have higher risks of 
epidemic diseases. This section will examine the issues regarding the relationship 
between health and urbanization, paying particular attention to issues related to 
migrant workers. 
15 However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, permanent migrant children are more likely to be enrolled in 
schools than local children, largely due to the highly selective nature of their parents.  
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6.1 Health Facilities and Inelastic Supplies 
In contrast to the tremendous expansion in education, the PRC’s health services sector 
has not witnessed significant growth in the last 2 decades. Figure 15 shows the 
number of hospitals, hospital beds, and doctors in different cities in the PRC in 1997 
and 2007.  
Figure 15: Growth in Health Sector, 1997–2007  
`  
continued on next page 
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Figure 16 continued 
 
Sources: NBS (1998), NBS (2008). 
6.2 Urbanization, Migration, and Health 
6.2.1 Living Conditions  
Migrants face high living costs, which can affect their health. Table 10 shows that a 
majority of migrant households lived in rented apartments provided by private 
landlords. Very few (i.e., less than 10%) could afford to buy an apartment. Importantly, 
although the income levels increased for migrants between 2005 and 2010, their living 
conditions have not improved. 
Table 10: Sources of Housing for Migrants 
 2005 2010 
Purchased 
Commercial 6.45 Commercial 6.74 
Affordable 0.97 Affordable 1.08 
Former public housing 2.23   
Self-constructed Self-constructed 4.54   
Rent 
Public 10.55 Provided by unit 6.47 
Commercial 56.29 Provided by government 0.08 
  Private 75 
Free   Free (by unit/government) 7.56 
Other  18.97 Other 3.07 
Total  100  100 
Obs  106,381  215,764 
Sources: Li (2013). 
Facilities inside living quarters were also examined to determine the living conditions of 
migrants. Around 30% of the migrant households lived in houses without toilets, and 
another 40%–50% lived in places with shared toilets. This reflects the poor living 
conditions of migrants (Table 11).  
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Table 11: Availability and Type of Toilet in Migrant Housing 
(%) 
 2005 2010 
Toilet (self-use) 34.87 37.13 
Shared toilet 7.54 11.4 
Other type (self-use) 15.25 10.94 
Other type shared 11.07 12.9 
No toilet inside 31.28 27.62 
Total 100.01 99.99 
Source: Li (2013). 
Next, living area space of migrant households was examined (Table 12). In 2005, the 
average living area for those living in rented rooms was around 12 to 13 square 
meters. According to Li (2013), around 30% of migrant workers’ living area per capita 
was below 6 square meters, which is the poverty line in terms of size of living area.  
Table 12: Living Area per Capita for Migrant Workers, 2005 and 2010 
 2005 2010 
Purchased  
Commercial 26.86 Commercial  24.97 
Affordable 22.77 Affordable  22.25 
Former public housing 19.53   
Self-constructed Self-constructed 26.16   
Rent  
Public  12.06 Provided by unit 12.59 
Commercial 12.66 Provided by govt 13.76 
  Private  12.35 
Free    Free (by unit/govt) 10.3 
Other   8.57 Other  19.63 
Source: Li (2013). 
From 2005 to 2010, living areas increased slightly for those renting houses, but for 
those living in purchased housing, the area actually decreased slightly, possibly due to 
the increased housing prices in many cities.  
Generally, the living conditions for migrants are poor, which may have a negative 
impact on their health (Niu et al. 2011; Wang, Su, Wen 2011). 
6.2.2 Health Insurance  
Due to the hukou system, many migrant workers are disproportionately distributed in 
the informal sector, with many not covered by health insurance. Table 13 shows that 
according to the 2005 1% population survey, less than 10% of migrant workers working 
in the informal sector (i.e., self-employed or those without formal labor contracts) had 
medical insurance. The situation is better if they had jobs with formal contracts, with the 
share increasing to 71%. For urban residents with local hukou, 54% of this population 
had medical insurance. If urban residents with formal contracts are examined, around 
60% had health insurance. Urban migrants who had urban hukou but migrated lie 
in between, with less than 20% of people working in the informal sector having medical 
insurance.  
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Table 13: Share of People with Health Insurance, 2005  
(%) 
 
Total 
Employees with 
Formal Contract Self-Employed 
Employees 
without Contract 
Urban residents 54 59 19 48 
Rural migrants 15 29 6 7 
Urban migrants 36 52 16 17 
Source: NBS (2005). 
Table 14 shows that fewer than 20% of rural migrant workers had health insurance in 
urban areas, and the situation improved only slightly in recent years. 
Table 14: Share of Rural Migrants with Health Insurance, 2008–2012  
(%) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Urban medical insurance 13.1 12.2 14.3 16.7 16.9 
Urban insurance for injuries 24.1 21.8 24.1 23.6 24.0 
Source: NBS (2013). 
A major issue is that insurance is largely confined within the locality of the workplace. 
By 2010, most rural residents were covered by the New Rural Cooperative Medical 
scheme, and migrants were covered in their respective hukou registration places. If a 
migrant must visit a hospital in another county, he or she must pay first. The cost is 
later reimbursed by the insurance from his or her hukou registration place, but the 
process is usually complicated and time-consuming.  
6.2.3 Health Consequences of Migration 
Health and migration behavior are closely related. Empirically, researchers have 
examined the effect of migration on health by comparing the health conditions of 
migrant workers and urban residents or rural nonmigrant residents. Zhou and Lu (2014) 
found that migrant workers’ health is significantly better than that of urban natives 
(Table 15).  
Table 15: Self-Reported Health of Migrant Workers and Urban Natives 
 
Whole Sample 
N = 3,439 
Rural Migrant 
Workers 
N = 668 
Urban Native 
Workers 
N = 2,771 
Self-reported health 3.99 (0.94) 4.12 (0.89) 3.96 (0.94) 
Notes:  
1. Rural migrant workers are those with rural hukou, but are working outside or have returned temporarily.  
2. Urban native workers are those with urban hukou who are working.  
3. Self-reported health takes values from 1 to 5, representing poor health, fairly poor, so-so, fairly good, and excellent.  
4. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
Source: Zhou and Lu (2014).  
This, however, is a selection effect; rural people migrating to cities tend to be younger 
and healthier. This is clearer in Table 16, where health conditions are reported by age 
group. In most of the cases, self-reported health was actually better for rural migrants 
than for urban native workers.  
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Table 16: Self-Reported Health of Migrant Workers  
and Urban Natives by Age Group 
Age 
Migrant Workers Urban Native Workers 
No. Health No. Health 
<=30  230 4.42 (0.77) 589 4.31 (0.81) 
31–40 209 4.06 (0.85) 843 4.10 (0.85) 
41–50 152 3.91 (0.93) 796 3.86 (0.94) 
51–60 62 3.74 (1.04) 418 3.60 (1.03) 
>=61 15 4.07 (0.96) 123 3.24 (0.95) 
Notes:  
1. Rural migrant workers are those with rural hukou, but are working outside or have returned temporarily.  
2. Urban native workers are those with urban hukou who are working.  
3. Self-reported health takes values from 1 to 5, representing poor health, fairly poor, so-so, fairly good, and excellent.  
4. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
Source: Zhou and Lu (2014).  
The selection process happened not only at the beginning but also after migrants 
arrived in urban areas. Among migrants, those suffering from poor health who tended 
to return home (early) after spending some time in urban areas. Table 17 shows that 
over 80% of migrant workers in bad health returned home; this share was around 50% 
for those in good health. 
Table 17: Health and Return Migration 
 No. Share of Return Migrants 
Healthy 532 0.49 
Fairly healthy 565 0.56 
So-so 315 0.64 
Fairly poor 170 0.81 
Poor 36 0.92 
Notes: Migrants are defined as those working outside of hukou registration, those who return temporarily to their place 
of hukou registration, and those who return permanently to their place of hukou registration. The last category is 
regarded as returnees.  
Source: Zhou and Lu (2014). 
In addition to the selection effect, working conditions in specific industries in urban 
areas tend to have negative effects on the health of migrant workers. Zhou and Lu 
(2014) found that the health of those working in the construction industry tends to 
deteriorate more rapidly than that of urban residents. Niu (2013) also found that the 
migration experience can be detrimental to migrants’ health. Thus, if health is thought 
of as another type of human capital, the depreciation rate is higher for migrant workers. 
More literature has examined the effect of migration on the health of two groups  
of children (i.e., migrant and “left-behind” children). Xu and Xie (2013) investigated  
the effect of migration on children’s well-being, finding that migration may be a  
double-edged sword. On the one hand, migration to cities exposes children to an  
urban environment that is characterized by new ideas, more permissive social norms, 
expanded peer networks, quality schools, nutrition-rich food, and modern hospitals. In 
these respects, migration can be an empowering experience for children. On the other 
hand, migrant children are confronted with the challenge of assimilating into a new 
social environment, which is somewhat alien to and perhaps even discriminatory 
toward them The study also pooled origin–destination child samples to form 
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appropriate comparisons and applied propensity score-matching methods to estimate 
the average treatment effects, finding significant positive effects of child migration on 
their objective well-being but no negative effects on their subjective well-being. It also 
found little difference between the left-behind and nonmigrant children across multiple 
life domains, highlighting the important role of migration in narrowing the long-standing 
rural–urban gap in child development in the PRC.  
Ren and Treiman (2013) looked at the effect of migration on left-behind children’s 
emotional well-being. While the expected effect was negative, the empirical results 
suggested that migration did not affect the health of “left-behind” children. 
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Human capital is an important factor in the urbanization process. Policies and 
institutional arrangements during this process also influence the human capital of  
both rural and urban residents. According to the analysis, several policy implications 
emerge: 
(i) The hukou system is still a major barrier to the mobility of the labor force and 
needs to be reformed. Both rural and urban migrant workers seem to be 
hindered by this system, as it seems that the system has higher costs for 
unskilled workers.  
(ii) The provision of both educational and health services are inelastic to the 
emerging demand in cities, especially large cities. Institutional reforms 
(including hukou) are needed to make the supply more elastic to surging 
demand. Private investment should be encouraged, and the government 
should subsidize and supervise such investment. 
(iii) The central government should take more responsibility in financing education 
at various levels, because education has externalities, and educated workers 
are highly mobile across regions. Education and health resources should also 
be allocated more equally across regions. 
(v)  Housing is also a major obstacle for migrants, as poor housing is a major 
factor impacting migrants’ health. The housing supply should be more elastic, 
and the current land regime should be reformed. 
(vi)  Rural areas are and will still be the reservoir of labor force in the urbanization 
process. Thus, education and medical services in rural areas should  
be improved, and a portable, nationally coordinated health care system 
established. 
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